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Abstract
The topic of my dissertation is the concept of nature and how Kant and Hegel each conceive ofit. Both agree that ‘nature’ cannot be an empirical concept but is rather presupposed in all experience
and object-related thinking. Yet, Kant holds that we can only conceive of nature as a unified whole
when we conceive of it as a mechanical system. Whereas, according to Hegel, the unity of all the
different kinds of natural phenomena can only be accounted for by means of his dialectical method.
A crucial and novel point in my reading of Kant is that the concept of nature as a mechanical system
is merely a regulative ideal, i.e., an imaginary end-point of science that we only approach asymptotically.
It is this point that allows me to resolve long-standing puzzles in the scholarship regarding organisms
and free will. For, this point allows for a coherent reading of Kant, a reading that involves that 1) we
do in fact have experience of organisms and that 2) Kant’s distinctive kind of determinism is
compatible with an open future. My reading of Kant furthermore provides a uniquely suited entry-
point into Hegel’s dialectical account of nature, according to which not only human beings and
organisms, but even solar systems do not fit the mould of a flat-footed mechanical determinism. This
allows me to show that Hegel is – in several respects – both an inheritor and radicalizer of Kant.