This thesis examines Parsons’ treatment of the human body in the forty-years he developed his general sociological theory, the general theory of action. It shows that when he unveiled his theory in 1937, the framework systematically excluded reference to the human body as a causative factor in human action and social life. Beginning with revisions in the 1950s, however, Parsons started to admit the body into the framework, giving it an increasingly prominent place as the theory continued to develop. Broadly, the analyses show how the two phases of theory differed; and with this, the focus is mostly analytical-descriptive in that it traces in detail the body’s place in the framework’s categories, concepts, logical forms, and substantive and counterfactual explanations. At the same time, the effort is guided by explanatory questions: namely, 1) why did Parsons initially, and resoundingly, exclude the body, and 2) what factors caused him to bring it back in the 1950s? Much of the answers are found in Parsons’ various writings in the periods. But, most importantly, they are also found in the very logical and conceptual structures of the framework. In essence, Parsons’ “writing the body out” in 1937 was an overresponse to his fears of biological determinism and reduction that were prevalent in the cultural and intellectual environment of the period, and especially virulent in the scientific racism, Eugenics movement, and the overseas Nazism to which these provided intellectual fodder. Parsons, likewise, saw what he regarded as inherent biological reduction in prevalent intellectual movements which he believed threatened sociology’s existence, and further institutionalization, as an independent science. These concerns are imprinted in the structures of the initial framework and in the theoretical choices—many of which were not only unnecessary, but also served to undercut ideas that would have strengthened the theory—Parsons made in that regard. Only after the success of the 1937 schema, did Parsons realize he needed to include aspects of the body, which he began to do in 1951. In this way, my effort is, metaphorically speaking, like a tree-ring analysis examining how environmental conditions “imprinted” in growth patterns registered in the “growth rings” of logical-conceptual structures and theoretical choices. Such “imprint analysis,” and the empirical imprinting it analyzes, is possible precisely because of the type of theory Parsons produced (i.e., general, foundational, and comprehensive) for better or for worse. In that regard, Parsons’ case offers a unique vista into the impact of major historical, cultural, and intellectual trends, and thus, on their influence on science and culture through influential scientific endeavors. The case also provides insights into the impact of long-standing cultural and intellectual antinomies (body/mind, nature/nurture, biology/sociology) in the social sciences and in Western science and culture more broadly. Finally, Parsons provides a unique example of confrontation with scientific issues concerning the body’s role in social life.