This dissertation centers action as analytic category in the study of Indian philosophy, particularly applied to the interpretation of Advaita that is best understood, as argued, through application of actional frames of interpretation (including such key categories as kriyā, karman, kārakatva, kartṛtva, sādhanatva, phalavattva, aṇgatva and bhāva). Its intellectual priorities are therefore articulated in terms of its framing under what is referred to as the rituogrammatic paradigm, which furnishes a theoretical framework that can explicate the focus on process (bhāva) and action-centrism (kriyāparatva) in the traditions/disciplines in play. The explanans and explanandum of both ritual and linguistic theory remains action, a focus having a likely origin in the ritual praxis and philosophy emerging from Vedic, Upanishadic and Mīmāṃsā attention to the actional being of language and world. I follow this intuition in the articulation of rituogrammatics as a paradigm whereby both, the action-centrism of grammar and, conversely, the grammaticality of action theory are brought into relief, isolating procedures involving ritual and grammatical elements functioning in tandem as an organic whole. Chapters 2 and 3 articulate the ritual and performative architecture of Advaita as a noetic ritual. Following Clooney’s account of thinking ritually, Chapter 2 tracks the persistence of this way of thinking in the Advaita of Śaṃkara. Thinking ritually may now be said to be deployed towards thinking 'spiritually', i.e., applying ritual thinking to the Upanishadic spirit or self. This happens in two ways. Firstly, Advaita borrows, wholesale, the ritual and performative model of analysis in its program of generating self-knowledge. In other words, Advaita is ritually constituted, and better understood under a model of performative coherence as opposed to simply hermeneutic coherence. This is mediated by emphasizing the Advaitic turn from the actional to the attentional, as a governance of the attentional landscape of the subject in order to recognize obtaining features of self and embodiment. Thus, while assimilating to a ritual model of purport, in its focus on the pre-existent and obtaining features of existence (bhūta, siddha, vastutantra)—as opposed to the Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā preoccupation with the presently non-existent to be produced or brought into being (bhavya, sādhya, puruṣatantra)—it marks a symbolic turn away from action-centrism. Chapter 3 explores the embodied landscape of the Advaitic noetic ritual, developing a reading of Śaṃkara’s affirmation of his project as Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā, a hermeneutics of embodiment. I thus complement the well-studied arena of Advaitic textual or scriptural hermeneutics with an embodied hermeneutics, and what this adds to our understanding of Advaita as mīmāṃsā. I distinguish between two closely related terms, adhyāsa and adhyāropa, both meaning, generally, ‘superimposition’, but pedagogically employed towards contrasting ends. Part II moves to the grammatical dimension of Advaitic rituogrammatics, showing how the turn away from ritual action-centrism is mediated linguistically by Advaitins. That is, how Śaṃkara and his successors develop a Sanskrit grammar of non-action (niṣkriyatva) as opposed to the normative action-centrism (kriyāparatva) of grammar theory. Just as grammarians and ritual theorists brought into focus the actional analyses of kāraka theory, bhāva and verb-centrism to support their action-centrism, so Śaṃkara recuperates certain phenomena of language—particularly nominal co-reference (sāmānādhikaraṇya), nominal sentences, noetic and existential verbs—to ground an Advaitic non-dual grammar of the sentence. I particularly develop the idea that their difference may be parsed in terms of their endorsement, respectively, of a bhāva-based and sat-based metaphysics; both (bhāva and sat) meaning, loosely, ‘being’, but connoting very different philosophical positions about reality. By employing such a non-dual grammar in the explication of certain sentences, particularly the Upanishadic identity statements, the alleged oneness of self and Brahman acquires a grammatical texture and basis. ‘Realizing’ the so- called identity of self and Brahman turns out, therefore, to be an intrinsically grammatical cognition and operation. Chapter 4 discusses the kāraka model of analysis and its critique by Śaṃkara, as well as the non-dual grammar of existential and noetic verbs. Chapter 5 articulates the concept of nominal co-reference (sāmānādhikaraṇya), more generally, sentential analysis (vākyaśāstra) furnishing an Advaitic grammar of non-action.