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Abstract
Scholars have long debated the normative issues entailed by securitization. Drawing on just war theory, I develop a systematic theory of when it is morally justified to securitize an issue, or frame it as an existential threat so important that exceptional, extra-legal measures must be taken to neutralize it. Securitization is just when there is a just referent object, a culpable aggressor, and when securitization is a proportional response. Taking individual persons as the ultimate unit of moral concern, I argue that they inherently just referent objects. States, other collectives, and non-human entities like the environment are just referent objects to the extent that they instantiate value for individuals. Culpable aggressors are those who act without sufficient justification to threaten a referent object, and thus become liable to a proportional amount of defensive harm. Securitization is proportional when the moral goods produced by securitization outweigh the evils, where the most important moral goods are individuals’ physical and ontological security. Using this framework, I analyze the morality of the securitization of migration in the European Union and the securitization of HIV/AIDS in the UN Security Council, which I argue are unjust and just, respectively. This paper illuminates the complicated moral issues entailed by securitization, demonstrates the importance of the intersubjective nature of securitization for theorizing its morality, and allows scholars to analyze the morality of securitization on a case-by-case basis.