What determines a citizen’s ability to migrate within a country? Why do autocracies, at times, encourage migration to urban areas and, at other points, halt all movement within the state? This paper attempts to answer these questions by analyzing migration policies in China and the former USSR. Both states formed distinctive policies that regulated all movement within the country. However, the degree of control varied depending on the economic and political goals at the moment. This paper is guided by the aim of understanding the strategic incentives of states to form institutionalized controls on migration and what causes these controls to shift. It ultimately argues that autocratic states determine internal migration policies by balancing goals towards industrialization with the fear and consequences of political instability. States will encourage migration when there is a high demand for labor and restrict movement when there is a fear of revolt. This paper has implications on migration studies and, with the recent resurgence of autocratic power, is crucial for our understanding of how autocracies control the natural rights of their citizens.