The formation of counterterrorism policy in the United States historically has been highly secretive and only discussed by policymakers behind closed doors. Counterterrorism policy is then simplified and presented to the public using preconstructed framing techniques. The manner in which policymakers frame terrorism impacts the public’s perceived threat level, desired counterterrorism response, and overall approval. Thus, there are political incentives to frame terrorist events and counterterrorism responses in a way that improves public reception.

How does public portrayal of terrorist incidents and counterterrorism strategy differ from internal discussions within the United States government? In this paper, I compare public speeches and declassified internal government directives regarding terrorist events and counterterrorism efforts from President Ronald Reagan through President George W. Bush’s administrations. I use archival research and discourse analysis of these primary source documents to determine that public and private counterterrorism discussion rarely contradict one another. Rather, private discussion of counterterrorism is used to actively construct how it is discussed in public forums. Through the lens of securitization theory, I find that war-based rhetoric and existential threat framing are used to justify militant and reactionary responses to terrorism that could be perceived to violate democratic norms.

Based on these findings, I offer recommendations for American leaders and national security officials. I argue that policymakers should reduce militant rhetoric and operate with greater transparency in order to improve public trust and protect American civil liberties. These findings can inform future counterterrorism efforts that are simultaneously effective and accountable. This study is significant in today’s threat environment due to continued relevance of the War on Terror in American society, ongoing public concerns about surveillance, and the rise of domestic terrorism.