This paper proposes the transfer of military aircraft between countries as a dependent variable to study signaling to multiple audiences in international relations. Aircraft transfers can produce many types of signals to multiple actors: positive and negative, both of which can be intentional, inextricable, or inadvertent. The predicted incidence of these signals, however, are independent variables that affect the outcome of an aircraft transfer. For example, countries may be incentivized to sell arms if the transfer will generate strategic and positive signals to a third-country that is allied with the recipient. Conversely, if a negative signal to the proposed recipient’s neighbors is inevitable, the sender might delay or modify the transfer to mitigate adverse third-country repercussions. Countries may further scale down or nix a transfer if other potential recipients, eavesdropping on the sale, would inadvertently receive a signal that the originator is willing to sell more advanced arms—thus affecting the reputation of the sender among third-countries through mechanisms like adjusted expectations or jealousy.