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Abstract
Central-local relation is an essential issue in understanding elite interaction in authoritarian regime formation, while most research of state formation focuses mainly on consolidation of sovereign power. Using social network analysis in the case of the Chinese communist state (the People’s Republic of China, PRC) in the early 1950s, this article analyzes regime centralization by focusing on the process of authoritarian strategies in shaping central-local co-working networks. Co-optation and re-shuffling are two major strategies in authoritarian regime survival. In the central-local relation of authoritarian state building, while co-optation produces a close central-local connection, political elites still have their own influence over their subordinates and play an important role in connecting the central and local echelon, as indicated by the case of the CCP Central promoting regional PLA military elites into the central government in 1952. Rather, through realigning with certain co-opted elites for support, central authoritarian leaders may reshape the central-local relation by reshuffling elites and the established elite co-working network is weakened. As for the Chinese communist elites, regional cadres still played a leading role in policymaking after 1952 until the abolishment of Regional Bureaus in 1954 after the intra-party cleavage of “Gao-Rao Affair”.