Politicians and organizational leaders always attempt to paint a picture of progress and relate their efforts to such improvements. However, the more governments attempt to do, “the more likely they are to be held liable for poor performance, or for policy changes that impose losses”. Generating supports while avoiding the risks of blame could be a paradoxical task for modern welfare states, especially during economic downturns and retrenchment. Yet the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seems to have consolidated its legitimacy from mobilizing poverty reduction and pandemic relief, even though the economic growth slows down and experiences a downturn, with problems such as inequality, nonprogrammatic distribution, and corrupted officials remaining. This paper argues that the CCP’s organizational embeddedness in the networks of China’s private sectors serves as one of the foundations of the CCP’s successful employment of strategies in disseminating responsibilities while preserving high capacity of monitoring, which enables it to both take the credit for successful adaptations and walk away from failed attempts. With both qualitative evidence and quantitative analysis, this thesis illustrates the mechanism of China’s unique state-business partnership and reveals how it helps the CCP to extend its reach of governance.