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Abstract
This thesis explores how resource-rich countries in the Global South use export bans on critical minerals as a strategy to enhance their position within global value chains. Although these restrictions are often designed to promote domestic downstream processing and reduce dependence on raw material exports, their outcomes remain highly heterogeneous across contexts. I argue that the effectiveness of critical mineral export restrictions in promoting downstream upgrading depends on both domestic institutional factors and the country’s position in the global market. Drawing on political economy theories of industrial upgrading and recent policy analyses, I focus on two commonly cited preconditions for successful upgrading: (1) market leverage, which captures the exporter’s strategic position in global supply chains, and (2) domestic industrial capacity, reflecting the ability to process and add value to raw materials. The analysis results show that market leverage is a strong and consistent predictor of downstream upgrading, while domestic capacity exhibits more limited or context-dependent effects. By doing so, the study contributes to the literature by reinforcing the importance of domestic readiness, while emphasizing the international structural conditions that enable industrial policy success. The empirical analysis draws on data collected by the OECD, comprising 185 mineral-specific export restriction policies adopted between 2008 and 2022 across 21 countries and 14 critical metals. A panel event-study design is adopted to assess policy effectiveness, measured through changes in revealed comparative advantage in targeted downstream products. This analysis focuses exclusively on country-mineral-year observations where export restrictions were imposed, examining how differences in international market leverage and domestic industrial capacity help explain variation in the effectiveness of these policies across cases. The results confirm that market leverage is positively and significantly associated with improvements in downstream competitiveness. However, industrial capacity does not predict better outcomes. This finding reinforces the theoretical discussion that structural capability alone may not translate into effective policy outcome, especially if political incentives, institutional arrangements, or global market dynamics dilute the impact of state intervention. These findings provide new grounds for theorizing upgrading outcomes as shaped not only by internal institutions but also by countries’ positions within global supply chains.