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Abstract
This thesis project explores the understudied dynamics between security services and leaders that often determine the result of political revolutions under authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Employing a novel formal model, the thesis uses Bayesian game theory to explore shifting decision making for protesters, leaders, and security services under uncertainty and over the course of revolutions. I analyze Sequential Bayesian Equilibrium concepts to formulate expressions players operate under to behave optimally based on their beliefs and players' actions at any period in the game. With a focus on post-Soviet Eurasia, the paper tests the formal model against cases of revolution in 2004 Ukraine, 2009 Moldova, and 2018 Armenia. Both the model and the cases demonstrate that a key driver of revolutionary development are belief gaps between the three players over the strength of protesters' resolve relative to the loyalty of security services. As revolutions develop, these gaps in belief narrow until the more resolute or loyal faction wins the contest. Analysis suggest that exposure to exogenous events (such as foreign intervention) and the relative costs and benefits of revolutionary results (transitional justice, economic and political rents) each determine how long each player will remain involved in the revolution. These dynamics largely explain the progression of revolutions in each case. Ukraine and Armenia experienced successful revolutions, while the initial revolutionary movement in Moldova failed. While the formal model provides intriguing insights about security service dynamics in post-Soviet Eurasia, modifications may be necessary to create a generalizable model of revolutionary behavior. Regimes such as military juntas and strong democracies may not operate under similar logic due to the distribution of power in each system.