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Abstract
This dissertation comprises two essays on competition in housing markets. The first essay investigates the impact of market power in residential real estate. I study this question empirically in the context of the Chicago rental market. To do so, I build a novel dataset that links the universe of market-rate multifamily properties and their owners from 2000 to 2023. Using a staggered event study design, I find that acquisitions of competing properties raise price and reduce occupancy. I then estimate a structural model of rental demand and supply, and use the estimates to calculate welfare under various policy counterfactuals. These results highlight how market power mediates the effectiveness of urban rental policies and shapes housing affordability in the 21st century. The second essay examines imperfect competition and quality degradation in affordable housing markets. In these markets, I hypothesize that landlords choose quality in order to maximize profit. To evaluate this hypothesis, I link all rental housing properties in the city of Chicago to data on building quality, and I explore how and when building acquisitions lead to changes in quality.