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Abstract
This dissertation explores how counter-revolutionary forces utilize a playbook to derail democracy and exploit the ostensibly pro-democratic international community’s efforts to secure a democratic transition. Focusing on Sudan’s attempted democratic transition (2019-2023) it consists of three chapters plus an introduction and conclusion that investigate the actions of civilian, international, and military actors during the transitional period and highlight the incentives that plunged the country into civil war. In 2019, the Sudanese uprising forced out President Omar al-Bashir capturing the world’s attention and providing optimism on the democratic prospects of nonviolent resistance movements in the wake of authoritarian resurgence in Egypt and Tunisia. Yet halfway through a planned 39- month run-up to elections, the Sudanese military carried out a coup against the transitional government. By April 2023, with a deal to return to the transition hanging in the balance, war broke out between factions of the military putting an end to hopes for a democratic Sudan. Chapter 2 (Escaping the Transition Trap) lays out the counter revolutionary playbook that was used against Sudan’s would-be democrats. This chapter argues that counter-revolutionaries worked hard to derail the prospects of democracy in Sudan, thrusting the opposition in a sort of transition trap. Similar to a finger trap, unless both the radical democratic forces and the established opposition parties pushed against the military, they would be unable to free themselves. Chapter 3 (With Friends Like These) examines the international community’s reliance on pacted transitions to “support” Sudan’s democratic transition. While pacted transitions are seen as a relatively safe way to shepherd democratic transitions, the international community in Sudan failed to see the danger of introducing additional division in a country with two militaries. The lack of a security guarantee due to the withdrawal of peacekeepers also gave the military free reign. Ultimately, the international community’s support of the military as a political actor deeply compromised the country’s democratic prospects. Chapter 4 (When Democratization Kills Peace) asks how likely civil war was in Sudan. By examining major correlates of civil war, the chapter makes the argument that though the country was at an elevated risk of civil war, the resulting conflict was not fought along ethnic lines as the literature would predict. Instead, the “war of the generals” was sparked by democratization, a known correlate of civil war that introduced a dangerous bargaining issue the generals chose to resolve with force.