Files
Abstract
This dissertation examines how political leaders confront an enduring dilemma: while foreign policy professionals offer critical expertise and continuity in managing inter-state relations, they can also undermine leaders’ authority through resistance, obstruction, or disloyalty. How, then, do leaders shape foreign policymaking institutions, rules, and norms to secure their policy goals in the face of potential bureaucratic resistance? I argue that leaders deploy distinct organizational strategies—combinations of formal and informal institutional tools—to adjust the degree of bureaucratic inclusion and control in foreign policymaking. These strategies reflect a balance between two core objectives: retaining the technical competence and institutional memory of the bureaucracy and securing loyalty to the leader’s agenda. Leaders who value control over competence tend to exclude or politicize the bureaucracy; those who prioritize competence promote its autonomy and neutrality.
The choice between control and competence hinges on a leader’s trust in the bureaucracy, shaped by psychological processes of social identification. Leaders who see themselves as fundamentally distinct from the bureaucratic establishment experience higher levels of distrust, increasing the perceived cost of bureaucratic input. Distrustful leaders are thus more likely to adopt exclusionary or loyalty-driven strategies—purging, coopting, or restructuring bureaucracies—whereas trustful leaders are more likely to tolerate inclusion and neutrality, even amid disagreement. Significantly, these strategic choices are constrained by a leader’s domestic political strength. Leaders with fewer political rivals can afford to expend more capital battling entrenched bureaucracies. Paradoxically, the most mistrustful leaders may refrain from politicizing bureaucracies if politically weak, while trustful leaders may sideline them when integration becomes too costly.
To test this theory, I employ comparative case studies across India, the United States, and Turkey. In India, Indira Gandhi moved from insulation to politicization as her political strength grew, while Manmohan Singh circumvented the bureaucracy in sensitive areas despite his inclusive style. In the U.S., Nixon insulated policymaking to avoid bureaucratic sabotage; Carter, amid conflict with the State Department, sometimes excluded it; and George H. W. Bush trusted and included bureaucratic actors. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan centralized and politicized foreign policy institutions as his political power solidified. Together, these cases reveal how trust, control, and political context shape the organization of foreign policymaking across regimes.