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Abstract
International Relations scholars frequently study the causes and consequences of war, but seldom how states’ armed forces operate during peacetime. This thesis addresses this gap by analyzing cordial withdrawals— military withdrawals undertaken by two partner states during peacetime conditions. Its causal factors, and how their importance has shifted from the Cold War unipolar order to the post-Cold War bipolar order are understudied by scholarly literature, which focuses on phenomena and withdrawal cases adjacent to cordial withdrawals, but not on cordial withdrawals themselves. Through archival analysis of 32 cordial withdrawal cases from 1958 to 2020, and a process tracing examination of the 1971 U.S. withdrawal from South Korea, my research found that deploying state factors are the most prevalent factors in cordial withdrawals overall, as said factors have the most direct impact on the deployed forces in question. Furthermore, there was an increase in cordial withdrawals in the post-Cold War period, as the U.S. both had reduced geopolitical competition abroad, and empowered inwards-looking domestic political actors, leading to deploying state factors being that period’s leading factors. By contrast, Cold War withdrawals were led by a mix of host and deploying state factors. These findings highlight the importance of cordial withdrawals, particularly as the U.S. seeks to strategically pivot to Asia while reassuring its allies in Europe. Understanding how cordial withdrawals work demonstrates how the U.S. manages commitments and credibility as geopolitical conditions change.