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Abstract
This thesis provides relevant recommendations to policymakers within the US National Capital Region, the international community, and academic researchers for a realistic ceasefire and stable peace equilibrium in Israel and Palestine. This paper does not intend to comprehensively account history of the long-standing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians nor does it analyze the wartime complexities of the Israel-Gaza War. Rather, this thesis focuses on specific causes for violence breaking out between Israel-Palestine and failed peace negotiations to inform policy recommendations. This thesis will research the implications of the failed Oslo Accords and identify precipitating factors of the Israel-Gaza conflict. The paper applies historical research, international relations, and game theory in a historical and current context in order to develop intervention tools that sustain long-term peace in Israel and Palestine. This framework gives more insights into why there was a peace-making “bargaining breakdown” on the Oslo process, why Hamas launched the October 7th, 2023 attacks against Israel, and the prospects for a peaceful future between Israel-Palestine. The Oslo peace process collapsed because of mutual out-group misperceptions, the anchoring effect in peace bargaining, internal political contestation within Israeli and Palestinian sides, and commitment problems. Hamas attacked on October 7th due to commitment problems, their waning political power in Gaza, its principal-agent relationship with Iran, intangible incentives for violence, uncertainty surrounding the Palestinian future, and misperceptions. The model of strategic terrorism coherently summarizes the strategic approaches and goals of Hamas, while conventional deterrence theory explicates the Israeli response in the Israel-Gaza War to this point. Finally, effective intervention tools for the peaceful resolution of civil wars illuminate a trajectory that best shapes long-term peace and stability in the region.