Abstract: This thesis investigates why small states, specifically the Central African Republic and Mali, have employed the Wagner Group in place of French military forces and UN peacekeepers. Despite the availability of traditional security actors, these states have increasingly turned to PMCs, signaling both dissatisfaction with existing international interventions and an appeal to the unique advantages PMCs provide. The theory advanced here highlights four key traits of PMCs that make them attractive to weak states: their ability to provide critical military capacity, willingness to subordinate to local regimes, operational autonomy, and willingness to commit strategic violence, including atrocities. The argument further contends that these traits, combined with the repeated failures of Western counterinsurgent and peacekeeping efforts, have made groups like Wagner appealing alternatives. Through a comparative case study of Mali and the Central African Republic, the thesis demonstrates how local governments, frustrated with ineffective international actors, have opted for more ruthless and responsive partners. This analysis also situates Wagner’s appeal within the broader historical context of post-colonial Franco-African relations, arguing that Wagner’s perceived superiority lies more in its nature as a PMC than as a geopolitical proxy for Russia.