Dual-coding theory proposes that superior memory for pictures compared to words (the ‘picture superiority effect’) and concrete words compared to abstract words (the ‘concrete- ness effect’) both stem from the ability to store information as verbal and image codes in memory. According to the theory, having two distinct memory codes increases recall prob- ability, as either code can independently lead to successful retrieval, and one code can serve to cue the other. The current study tests this theoretical explanation by examining recall performance in individuals with aphantasia—the inability to voluntarily generate mental imagery. Based on dual-coding theory, aphantasic individuals should show neither picture superiority nor concreteness effects due to these individuals’ inability to generate mental images and retrieve image-based memory codes. We recruited 62 aphantasic individuals and 69 typical imagers who completed a memory task with free recall of studied stimuli. Data were analyzed using mixed ANOVA and planned comparison t-tests. We compared recall performance between aphantasic and typical imagers across four stimulus types: pictures, symbols, concrete words, and abstract words. Despite their mental imagery deficit, aphan- tasic individuals demonstrated a robust picture superiority effect. Moreover, while typical populations show similar recall for pictures and symbols, aphantasic individuals displayed superior recall for symbols compared to pictures, perhaps because symbols’ simpler visual properties enable more efficient encoding through alternative strategies like motor imagery. In addition, both aphantasics and controls showed better performance with abstract relative to concrete words—contrary to typical concreteness effects—possibly because our abstract words had corresponding everyday symbols that made them more readily processed despite imagery limitations. These recall patterns across different stimuli in aphantasics challenge dual-coding theory’s explanation that superior recall for visual stimuli stems primarily from the formation and retrieval of supplementary image codes, indicating that either dual-coding is incorrect and some other non-dual-coding mechanism is responsible, or that, at the very least, dual-coding theory requires substantial modification to account for our present find- ings. This study provides novel insights into the relation between mental imagery and memory, challenging traditional theoretical frameworks and suggesting the need for alter- native explanations of these well-established memory phenomena.