A rich body of literature suggests that China engages in digital authoritarianism through exports of surveillance technology to illiberal states. Using data from the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and the United Nations Comtrade database, I challenge this prevailing viewpoint. Through a mixed methods approach, I argue that existing scholarship on this topic substantially overstates the degree to which China engages in the export of digital repression. In contrast to the prevailing theory of digital authoritarianism, I propose a theory of instrumental technological diffusion. In other words, I argue that Chinese exports of surveillance products are motivated primarily by instrumental and pragmatic goals, not ideology. China holds a comparative advantage in the manufacture of surveillance technology thanks to its repression of citizens domestically. But rather than attempting to export this model abroad, Beijing merely uses this comparative advantage as a tool to achieve other foreign policy objectives, namely closer relations with states. These recipient states, in turn, have relatively benign motives to seek out surveillance technology from China. An empirical analysis of trade flows reveals an ideologically diverse network of trade partners. Furthermore, I find only limited support for the idea that Chinese surveillance products produce declines in popular unrest. Indeed, in the short term, these exports may in fact increase, rather than decrease, protest activity. Taken together, these results suggest that counter to most intuitions, China does not engage in a coordinated campaign to foster technological illiberalism abroad, Furthermore, my findings indicate that such a campaign would be ineffective if it were to occur. These results carry important policy implications for decision makers in the West. They imply that countering China’s technological influence is not merely a matter of scaring partners about autocracy; it requires addressing the real public problems that drive them to accept Chinese solutions in the first place.