This paper examines the decision-making process and motives behind the United States’ foreign aid to Indonesia during the 1960s, focusing on the period before and after the September 30 Movement. It aims to clarify how American foreign aid policies aligned with Hans J. Morgenthau's theoretical framework, which emphasizes political influence, national security, economic development, and ideological goals as the primary objectives of foreign aid. Using qualitative methods to analyze declassified documents, the paper maps the opposing policy considerations and compromises that shaped the United States' foreign aid decisions. Before the September 30 Movement, the United States reduced aid to pressure President Sukarno to end his Confrontation Policy against Malaysia and alignment with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). After the movement, United States aid increased to support the Indonesian military against the PKI in a covert manner to avoid negative publicity. The study reveals that the United States’ foreign aid policies were driven by a need to maintain a public image, bilateral relations, and national interests. These findings complement existing literature and demonstrate that United States foreign aid to Indonesia was a strategic tool to advance American interests, consistent with Morgenthau's theory.