This thesis examines the root causes of Mexico’s inability to consolidate democratically despite premature claims that Mexico was becoming a competitive electoral democracy at the turn of the 21st century. I argue that many reforms and institutions held to be “transformative” since the Presidential administration of Carlos Salinas De Gortari (1988-1994) were merely “window dressing” and ineffective. Through the framework of “weak institutions” proposed by Brinks, Levitsky, and Murillo, I utilize the case study of Mexico from 1988 to 2018 to categorize major Mexican reforms and new institutions as either “insignificant,” “unstable,” or “non-compliant.” This thesis project aims to take a first step in analyzing the causality of “weak institutions” in Mexico and its constant struggles with democratic backsliding, as it demonstrates how the executive branch hinders Mexico's ability to consolidate democratically.