This dissertation consists of two essays in labor economics and political economy, both focused on Chile. The first examines the effect of changes in the level of collective bargaining on compensation, while the second explores the political effects of forced displacement. The first chapter studies the effect of allowing workers to expand bargaining units across firms on their wages. It focuses on a labor reform in Chile that prevented businesses from splitting their labor force into smaller legal entities, enabling workers to form larger collective bargaining units. This chapter uses a dynamic difference-in-differences design, comparing affected firms with firms in the same industries that were not impacted by the reform. The results show that the policy increased both the average earnings and the dispersion of earnings among full-time workers, without affecting employment levels or firms’ profitability. The effects are driven by businesses that initially employed fewer workers and in which firms shared a headquarters municipality, suggesting a key role of coordination costs. This evidence suggests that increasing the level of collective bargaining strengthens the bargaining power of full-time workers and may improve their welfare. The second chapter examines the long-term impact of forced relocation to disadvantaged neighborhoods on political participation, using evidence from a large-scale slum clearance program in Santiago, Chile, between 1979 and 1985. Under this policy, public housing was allocated to slum dwellers, with one-third remaining in their original neighborhoods and the rest relocated to peripheral, low-opportunity areas. Using rich archival and administrative data, we analyze the effects of displacement separately for adults and children. We find that displaced children and adults experienced a significant decline in voter registration in 2011, compared to non-displaced individuals. While the results show no overall effect on the likelihood of being a candidate, displaced adult males were significantly less likely to run for office. The impact of displacement on registration was weaker for individuals facing greater expected disruption, such as those relocated separately from their original slum community or who moved longer distances. These results are not driven by access to registration boards or criminal justice involvement. These findings suggest that forced displacement can have persistent intergenerational effects on political participation, with implications for the political representation of low-income communities.