To produce effective behavior, it is critical that an organism be able to identify which parts of its sensory world are caused by its actions. On one hand, successful assignment of sensory outcomes to specific actions is critical for sensorimotor learning. Any organism that learns motor behaviors from sensory feedback must have a biological solution to the “hindsight credit assignment” problem, assigning temporally distal outcomes to self-generated actions. On the other hand, we also have a salient conscious experience of causing events in the world through our actions – that is, a sense of agency. The degree to which conscious agency is derived from the same neurocognitive operations that support sensorimotor control has been the subject of extensive debate, with far-reaching implications from the philosophy of self-awareness to motor rehabilitation and embodied interface design. This work examines the relationship between inferences of self-causation made at different scales of cognition. Chapter 1 illustrates the nontriviality of low-level hindsight credit assignment in the context of human speech production, where the nonlinear physics of the vocomotor periphery decouples the timings of acoustic events from that of articulatory movements. Moreover, it presents electrophysiological evidence for a mechanism to restore temporal coherence between neural activity and sensory feedback, the implications of which are elaborated by parallels to findings from the birdsong system. Chapter 2 presents an experiment in which the timing of electrical muscle stimulation is manipulated, using a novel adaptive paradigm, to reliably elicit self-reported agency over externally-actuated muscle movements. Claims of self-agency over externally-caused movements are predictable from the early sensorineural response to muscle stimulation, firmly rooting the origins of bodily sense of agency in sensorimotor processes while also reinforcing a dissociation between conscious and objective agency. Chapter 3 examines the relationship between individual differences in sensorimotor-level control judgments and high-level declarative beliefs about agency. A relationship is confirmed but found to be mediated by conscious introspection (i.e. metacognition), suggesting a preferential role of consciously accessible mental contents in the formation of self-agency beliefs. Taken together, findings suggest that aspects of low-level movement control impact the sense of agency, even at levels of behavioral organization which are not explicitly motor in nature. The dissertation closes with a critical Discussion of the theoretical assumptions underlying current approaches to cognitive neuroscience. Specifically, I argue that to accomplish the goal of identifying those motor and cognitive processes that impinge upon conscious agency, we must dispense with the categorical error of conflating (especially macroscopic) neural dynamics with direct encodings of mental representations.