This paper focuses on the duality of names in Plato’s philosophy. Names are conventionally established and bind laymen to the perceptible realm, yet they also serve as a crucial pathway to the hidden nature of reality. To address this tension, the paper argues that the Tool Analogy in Cratylus 386a-390a presents a teleological framework that can be articulated in two claims. First, Plato endorses the Tool Analogy, where names are correct if assigned to natural kinds, without committing to the etymological-mimetic account later developed in the dialogue. Second, names are revisable as dialecticians impose new meanings on them to refine their boundaries. Originating from conventions that imprecisely outline reality, names are revised by dialecticians to fix the extensions of natural kinds through essential definitions. This process further explains Plato’s adherence to existing names rather than the construction of ideal languages, underscoring his dialectics as a fundamentally pedagogical project.