My thesis explores the expansion of executive power in the United States during the Iraq War, focusing on the interplay between congressional and judicial deference, public opinion, and the normalization of emergency governance. At the heart of this study is the concept of the "State of Exception," a legal and political framework that allows for the suspension of normal constitutional rules during times of crisis. By examining the Iraq War through this lens, my thesis investigates how the executive branch leveraged national security concerns to justify the aggregation of expansive war powers, transforming extraordinary measures into a permanent feature of governance. It traces how the Bush administration used rhetoric and the selective release of intelligence to frame Iraq as an existential threat, securing public support for actions that expanded executive authority. My study also examines congressional inaction and the passage of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the PATRIOT Act, which institutionalized these powers. Additionally, I explore key legal challenges such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush, which reinforced the normalization of certain executive wartime powers while reaffirming certain procedural protections for detainees. By bridging scholarship on emergency governance, executive discretion, and securitization, this thesis reveals how the actions of the executive branch in the context of the Iraq War shifted the balance of power among the three branches of government in favor of itself. It illustrates how public support for emergency actions, coupled with institutional passivity and acquiescence, led to the normalization of extraordinary measures as a new modus operandi. The thesis concludes by addressing the broader risks of eroding democratic safeguards through this shift in power and suggests areas for further research on the future of emergency governance and civil liberties.