Scholars interested in Sino-Soviet-US triangular relations have generally been contending that during the early 1960s, the John F. Kennedy administration had committed itself to the wedge strategy – namely, to exacerbate the increasingly furious Sino-Soviet dispute – of which the American pursuit of the Limited Test Ban Treaty was a crucial part. However, I, as this thesis shows, am convinced that the Kennedy administration had been more concerned about exploiting than aggravating the Sino-Soviet split, although it did take pains to avoid the reconciliation between the Chinese and the Soviets. This not only had to do with the constant uncertainties about the future of Sino-Soviet relations but also was out of the American hope to use the Soviet restraint of China, which demanded the residual Soviet leverage on the Chinese. Therefore, I view the American quest for the test ban not as the wedge strategy’s embodiment but as an excellent case of the US utilizing the Sino-Soviet discord to stifle China’s nuclear program. Actually, with the American struggle for the underdeveloped world, China’s global revolutionary initiatives and nuclear ambitions made it the archenemy of the United States, much more dangerous than the Soviets advocating peaceful coexistence. Lastly and fundamentally, the Americans, embracing Wilsonian liberalism, had not expected much from the communist infighting.