There is wide agreement that the nuclear deterrence strategy pursued by the United States is irrational. Under the rational process a state should have recognized the logics of mutual kill and prioritized a strategy of deterrence by punishment with a force only capable of a secure second strike. Instead, the United States has continually prioritized a superiority strategy premised on counterforce and the logic of deterrence by denial. Despite this diagnosis, very few, if any, studies have attempted to fully interrogate the decision-making process that led to irrational policy. This study attempts to do just that by centering itself on the concept of empirical uncertainty. Empirical uncertainty means that all theories of deterrence untested in the real world. Without concrete evidence upon which to guide their policy choices, policymakers fall back on a process of muddling through where they select goals and strategies familiar to them. In the case of the United States it’s initial thermonuclear deterrence strategy was formed in the first year of Eisenhower administration under a muddled process. The National Security Council and applied the familiar goal of absolute victory and superiority strategies premised on deterrence by denial to thermonuclear weapons and developed a strategy based on counterforce and a policy of massive retaliation. This overly aggressive policy instigated a security dilemma that continues to endanger the world to this day.