This dissertation critically interrogates existing frameworks of responsibility for large-scale, transnational harms. Each chapter focuses on one framework—moral, political, and legal, respectively, tracing the relationship between individual agents and the structures that produce the harms. All three frameworks focus on the role of individual agents at the expense of the structural conditions that give rise to the harms. Chapter 1 examines the framework for moral responsibility within the “global justice” literature and what I contend is its central question: “What do we owe distant suffering strangers?” Obscured by the question are the structural connections between the “saviors” (from the global North) and the “suffering strangers” (from the global South), Chapter 2 confronts the contemporary framework for political responsibility centered on citizenship within a nation-state by assessing the reality of so-called “stateless” individuals. The individual rights-bearing stateless person emerges as a sort of illusion, one that nonetheless masks the state structures and officials that render individuals stateless. Also removed from view are the individual state citizens that contribute to the system by, among other things, accepting its terms and playing by its rules. Chapter 3 engages the legal framework that has governed the prevention and prosecution of genocide under international law, which interprets the definition of genocide as requiring that particular individuals harbor an “intent to destroy” the targeted group. When the existence of genocide turns on perceptions of individual perpetrators’ internal mental states, the structures that produced the allegedly genocidal violence, the other individuals who contributed to those structures, and the victims of the genocide are all secondary. Obscured by these frameworks, therefore, is not just the dynamic between individual agent and structural conditions, but also the relationship among the individual agents whom structures connect. The dissertation concludes arguing that existing frameworks for responsibility need more than just supplementation. They also need to be reconceived so that they are better attuned to the structures that produce the harms and the relations among individuals that they forge. These imagined alternatives do not offer additional grounds to persuade us that we should feel responsible but, rather, illuminate ways to improve our responses.