This thesis is a collection of three articles—(i) The Problem of Low Interest Rates in Civil Litigation in India, (ii) Missing Women: An Explanation, and (iii) NIMBYism and Fiscally Affordable Housing. The Problem of Low Interest Rates in Civil Litigation in India identifies a possible explanation for judicial delays in India. Ideally, a successful litigant should be compensated for the time-value of money (interest) for the period between the cause of action and the recovery of money. However, Indian laws award much lower interest to winning litigants, when compared to other common law countries. Interest rate awarded also depends on the nature of the dispute, rather than the cost of capital of the parties. Further, the jurisprudence developed on Indian statutory law has resulted in a system that inconsistently awards interest and favors awarding lower interest rates. One case involving a large Indian firm elucidates the incentives that are set up by the low interest rates awarded in judgments. This case shows that defendants have the incentive to drag out cases, even if they know that they will eventually lose the case. Missing Women: An Explanation provides a novel explanation to the problem of female feticide (also known as son preference). By 2010, it was estimated that around 126 million women were missing through sex selective abortions. Multiple explanations have been provided for this observed son preference. However, these explanations do not fit the existing data or are tailored to individual cases. This paper provides the first generalized explanation for the problem of missing women—a type of land reforms called: land to the tiller programs. Under these reforms, the government distributes agricultural land to farmers, but the government places various legal restrictions on transferring, using, or leasing such agricultural land. These legal restrictions imposed by the land to the tiller program create economic pressure to beget sons to maintain possession of land when the present owners are too old to farm the land personally. Cross country data shows a clear temporal link between land to the tiller reforms being implemented and sex-ratio-at-birth deteriorating. Additionally, similarly positioned countries that did not implement land to the tiller programs do not show son preference through sex-selective abortions. NIMBYism and Fiscally Affordable Housing attempts to explain the rising costs of homes in the U.S. There is developing consensus that the rise in home prices is being driven by NIMBYism which results in exclusionary zoning laws. However, the existing literature on this type of NIMBYism is fragmented, with multiple explanations for the phenomenon. The paper provides a novel explanation as to why cities engage in NIMBYism: a combination of the interests of the citizens and the city government’s incentives driven by public choice. This novel explanation is supported by a detailed analysis of the public finance of the U.S.’s largest cities over a 39-year period. The model proposed in the paper also explains another phenomenon—resistance to gentrification.