This dissertation explores the intricate dynamics of political behavior and incentive mechanisms within non-democratic systems, with a focus on China's unique governance structure. It comprises three comprehensive chapters, each addressing distinct yet interrelated aspects of political maneuvering and strategic decision-making by political players. Chapter 1 delves into the manipulation of GDP growth by local Chinese officials, particularly mayors and prefecture Party secretaries, as a strategy for career advancement. Through an extensive analysis of career trajectories for 536 Party secretaries and 583 mayors, this chapter reveals how these officials engage in GDP manipulation at critical junctures in their careers to secure promotions. Employing a game theory model, findings demonstrate that both mayors and secretaries exploit their last opportunity for advancement to positions of real authority by artificially boosting GDP figures. However, this manipulation is met with heightened promotion criteria by higher authorities, particularly for secretaries at pivotal ages who must exceed average GDP growth rates significantly to be considered for promotion. Interestingly, the presence of mayors poised to succeed them acts as a deterrent against secretaries’ short-sighted economic policies, suggesting a complex interplay that favors long-term development over immediate gains. Chapter 2 investigates the survival strategies of governments facing threats from various actors with divergent interests. It posits that strategic institution building, which initially disadvantages and later empowers certain challengers, can delay rebellions. This nuanced approach to managing political dissent and conflict highlights the importance of timing in the transition of institutional power, providing insights into the economic and political evolution observed in China. The government's manipulation of perceived benefits to delay potential uprisings underscores the delicate balance between short-term survival and long-term stability. Chapter 3 focuses on the non-revenue-maximizing incentives driving government actions in China's land market auctions, such as corruption, financial pressures, and long-term development goals. By analyzing the impact of anti-corruption campaigns and local government debt on auction outcomes, the study highlights a shift towards transparency and strategic financial management. The involvement of major developers in setting auction prices further illuminates the government's incentive to ensure the developmental viability of land, balancing immediate financial needs against broader economic objectives. Overall, this dissertation sheds light on the complex behaviors and incentives of political players in non-democratic systems, offering a nuanced understanding of the strategies employed to navigate the challenges of governance, economic development, and political stability in China.