This dissertation is comprised of three distinct works of research that investigate inconsistencies in people’s judgments and decisions with the goal of deriving insights that can inform our understanding of how people make economic decisions. The first two chapters focus on intertemporal choice, while the third chapter examines people’s marketplace inferences. The first and second chapters evaluate the common assumptions in the existing time discounting literature and propose new accounts for how consumers make intertemporal choices that can explain behaviors that deviate from the predictions of traditional time discounting models. Specifically, the first chapter examines how consumers’ subjective financial periods—the idiosyncratic time categories they use to manage their financial goals—affect their intertemporal choice over financial benefits. Consumers are more impatient when choosing between options that are in different subjective financial periods than when choosing between options within the same subjective period. This leads them to exhibit time-inconsistent preferences, which have commonly been attributed to present bias in prior research. The second chapter documents how consumers’ impatience to receive progress signals—actions or events that provide information about the progress of delayed rewards—separately from their impatience to receive the actual rewards, affects their intertemporal choice. Holding reward timings constant, people exhibit higher impatience for options that offer sooner progress signals, which offer sooner uncertainty reduction. This phenomenon is not well-accommodated within the traditional time discounting framework, which assumes that consumers’ choices are based on the valuation of the rewards as a function of their timing. The last chapter examines how people compare different people's liking of an option based on their consideration sets, specifically the size of the sets (i.e., the number of items included in the consideration set). People infer that a consumer with a smaller consideration set likes an option in the set more than another consumer with a larger consideration set that includes the same option. However, this inference is subject to change depending on how salient the superordinate category structure of the options is.