In this paper, I explore the questions: Has the securitization of critical minerals succeeded? If yes, what is the character of this securitization? Specifically, I focus on minerals such as lithium and cobalt, which I argue have been securitized in terms of both China’s dominance over the supply chain and their use in clean energy technologies to address climate change. I use this case study of critical mineral extraction to argue for a new temporal element to securitization. While most of the securitization literature posits that governments securitize before an extraordinary measure has been implemented in order to justify that measure to their domestic publics, I argue that in the process of projective securitization, securitization can occur after an extraordinary measure has already existed for some time. I demonstrate that critical mineral exploitation in the Global South—which I consider an ‘extraordinary measure'—has occurred since at least the 1970s, during which these minerals were not securitized to nearly the same extent as they are today. Through process tracing and a discourse analysis of U.S. government and advocacy group outputs on critical minerals, I demonstrate that as crisis points emerged in which advocacy groups started to call public attention to this exploitation, the U.S. government ramped up its securitizing attempts. I then demonstrate how advocacy groups subsequently changed the character of their critical mineral discourse, accepting the U.S. government’s securitizing language. These findings demonstrate that further research should be done on the different temporal elements of securitization.