Terror groups do not attack random targets and we know this because there is strategy and logic behind their target selection. Many terror groups are known for civilian attacks, but a considerable number of groups simultaneously attack “hard targets” as well. Many groups target military bases, soldiers, police forces, and government officials, and even high-profile political leaders. Given that hard targets are well-protected, costlier to attack, and there is a greater risk of failure, why would some terror groups focus relatively more of their attacks on hard targets? Existing literature offers several explanations for terrorists’ target selection. Some scholars argue that is it is primarily an organizations attributes, like size, age, and ideology, that contribute to target selections, others focus on the psychological aspects of the group, and another group of scholars explain target selection through an objective lens. Utilizing the Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset (1980-2011) and including indicators from the Global Terrorism Database, we offer a new explanation and argue that terror groups that seek to build a positive reputation among their local constituency are the ones that are more likely to go after a greater number of hard targets. By illustrating the link between reputation building and target selection, this work paves the way for thinking about how reputationally motivated terror groups compete against one another.