A Study of the Effects of Voter Income on a State's Tariff Policy

How does the income makeup of a ruling party’s electorate affect how progressive or regressive its trade policy is? This thesis expands upon public choice theory, public opinion, and current international relations trade scholarship by investigating the link between low income status and progressive tariff policy, using product-level income elasticity of demand to measure the degree to which a country’s Consolidated Tariff Schedule (CTS) is progressive or regressive. Performing a regression analysis, I find that there is no correlation between ruling party support from low-income voters and progressive or regressive tariff policy. Furthermore, I argue that the low salience of trade policy and the influence of industry lobbies cause this disconnect between low-income voters and their elected leaders. This finding lends support to the Magee-Brock-Young and Grossman-Helpman models, failing to find evidence that public opinion through economic self-interest is a significant determinant of tariff policy. This analysis helps to clarify the effect of public opinion on trade policy and opens up the door to new analyses of non-tariff barriers and identity as a determinant of trade policy.