Published October 29, 2022 | Version v1
Journal article Open

State of the Fiscal Contract in Lagos' Informal Settlements

  • 1. University of Chicago
  • 2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Description

Governments often have contentious relationships with residents of urban informal settlements. Motivated by the desire for rents and dreams of becoming the next luxury destination, city governments worldwide have forcefully evicted and demolished informal communities in this pursuit. In such instances it would seem that the state has broken the social contract with its most vulnerable citizens. How do citizens respond? We might expect them to reciprocate in kind, by withholding taxes owed to the government. Using a survey of citizens living in informal settlements across Lagos State in Nigeria, we explore what predicts citizens' willingness to comply with government taxation. In this unlikely context for voluntary compliance, we observe that a third of respondents pay taxes and a majority are willing to pay absent enforcement. We find minimal support for standard theories of tax payment — trust in or reciprocity toward the government, or identification with the nation. Instead, we find that willingness to pay taxes is correlated with group membership, believing that community members respect taxpayers, and donating to the community. Our data suggest that local institutions and social relations are associated with citizens' willingness to comply with tax policy.

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Additional details

Identifiers

DOI
10.1007/s12116-022-09369-6
Other
oai:uchicago.tind.io:5067

Funding

MIT GOV/LAB
MIT Libraries
Open access funding

UChicago Information

Division(s)
Social Sciences Division
Center(s) or Institute(s)
Becker Friedman Institute for Economics