The Intensity of Fear in International Crises

Emotions are a central aspect of international relations. Fear is associated with crisis scenarios and has led to varying responses ranging from diplomacy to military aggression. What explains such variation? Existing models treat fear as a binary without considering its intensity. This paper addresses this gap by developing an operation model grounded in appraisal theory. Drawing on cognitive psychology, I seek to explain how states interpret threatening events through three stages: relevance, implication level, and coping potential. Through these appraisals, fear and its associated intensity are formed and influence the range of policy behavior. To test this model, I conduct a plausibility probe using two United States (U.S.) foreign policy crisis case studies: the Cuban Missile Crisis and the North Korean Missile Crisis of 1994. For the first case, moderate fear—driven by perceptions of high implications and high coping potential—lead to a defensive option of the blockade or "quarantine." In contrast, heightened feelings of fear during the latter case—stemming from both perceived high implications and low coping potential—pushed the U.S. to seriously consider initiating a military operation. If we take my operational model seriously, scholars investigating emotion must incorporate an emotion's intensity level with discussing state behavior.