To Hedge or Wedge? Geographic Proximity, Signaling, and Power Transition

When and why do rising states hedge or wedge hegemonic states? What determines the optimal competitive strategies of rising powers against the hegemon that challenges their security interests? This article explores the debate on how the rising great power resorts to non-warfare strategies to compete with the dominant power during the power shift. Rising states primarily base their decisions on two factors: first, the geopolitical distance between the rival states—whether the two reside in the same region; and second, the commonality of intra-alliance security interests between the great power patron and its allies. The interaction between these non-material variables essentially constitutes a signaling mechanism, which yields different strategic options for rising states in response to a particular format of balancing against the main opponent(s). Evidence drawn from extensive historiography and primary documents of imperial Germany's pre-war foreign policy towards Great Britain and China's strategies toward Taiwan provides a demonstration for this argument. The findings shed light on how great powers manage security competition as an alternative to conventional accounts of warfare tactics.