Cyber Pearl Harbor or Cyber Hiroshima? Coercion and Escalation in Cyberspace

Technological advancement in the arena of cyber weaponry has opened the door for new strategies of coercion to be utilized by states. The theory presented in this thesis attempts to understand the future practice of coercion in cyberspace. It argues that destabilizing offensive cyber operations advances the ability of states to achieve coercive success without the necessity of employing conventional kinetic weaponry. A rebuttal to the notion that a destabilizing offensive cyber operation will resemble the attacks on Pearl Harbor is presented. We argue that such an attack would more so resemble the bombing of Hiroshima. This is because such an attack would be chosen in attempt to minimize the loss of civilian life and would simultaneously use all four major strategies of coercion. This conclusion calls into question arguments supporting the "Cyber Pearl Harbor" narrative as well as previous studies which have dismissed the strategic and tactical utility of cyber weaponry. Illustrative case studies concerning the effectiveness of economic sanctions and the economic damage of large-scale attacks, as well as the bombing of Hiroshima and the attack on Pearl Harbor, provide initial validation of the theoretical arguments made here.