Can't Always Get What You Want: Conduct Entanglement in U.S. Alliances

This thesis investigates the degree to which weaker states in an alliance can influence stronger states in their alliance to conduct a conflict in the manner in which the weaker state prefers, even if it is damaging to the stronger state in the alliance. Building on Beckley (2015), and the broader entanglement literature, I investigate the American historical record to identify cases in which this process, which I refer to as conduct entanglement, occurs. I focus on two of my four identified cases: the Berlin Crises of 1958-59 and 1961. Using causal process observation, I closely examine the internal communication and decision-making of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations as they engaged with the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany. I theorize that the presence of conduct entanglement is dependent on the ability of a protégé to shape their patron's perceived costs and alter their cost-benefit analysis. If a protégé can successfully convince their patron that they will incur more costs if they continue with their preferred strategy and can avoid such costs by partaking in their strategy, the leader will be compelled to support the protégé as they desire. I argue that this is often done through firm interstate posturing and public displays of costly signaling, which convince the patron of the protégé's unwillingness to move from their policy. These findings hold major implications. Firstly, this is the first empirical analysis of conduct entanglement, demonstrating a key, underresearched way in which weaker states can influence the actions of their stronger allies. Furthermore, I find that conduct entanglement is not inherently escalatory. While much of the literature assumes that protégés only work to force their patrons into more violent conflicts and vehemently defend their interests, I find that conduct entanglement works both ways.