Latent Nationalism: The Self-Determination of Minorities in Asymmetric Interstate Competition

Though as old as empire itself, "divide-and-conquer" endures as a strategy in contemporary interstate security competition. Yet despite its longevity, existing international relations scholarship offers limited insight into why states deliberately fragment another state's population, or how such social fragmentation is expedient to their security interests. This original research paper investigates why stronger states support the self-determination of minorities in weaker states—even when the existing asymmetric balance of power already favors them and the circumstances do not necessitate such strategies. It examines the strategic potency of external state support for a spectrum of self-determination outcomes, ranging from affirmative action and regional autonomy to full independent statehood. To address this puzzle, I combine process tracing of historical case studies with linear regression analysis of an original large-N dataset. The findings contribute a novel theory to the security competition literature by offering explanatory power to divide-and-conquer strategies. I argue that stronger states support the self-determination of minorities in weaker states to threaten the survival prospects of the weaker counterpart. The strategy is employed when the weaker state exhibits a Latent Nationalism—an ideological force capable of fuelling the five core pillars of state survival: population cohesion, economic wealth, legitimate authority, military capacity, and territorial integrity. This is because nationalism is the ideological fuel that strengthens these core pillars, ensures a weak state's survival, and can increase its relative power and shift the balance in its favor, threatening the asymmetric balance. Thus, stronger states use this strategy not only to weaken those pillars, but to preserve or widen the existing asymmetric balance of power in their favor and in turn, enhance their own security.