Rethinking the Actual Security Strategy of Vietnam, a Middle Power's Status in the International Order

Middle powers do matter within the international order. They are therefore capable of implementing their own agenda and security policy. However, to what extent does their policy have an impact on great powers' agenda? Especially when middle powers are navigating triangular relations with two other great powers, how can they display a security strategy that allows them to be a proactive actor in the world order? The conventional wisdom is that middle powers hedge vis-à-vis great powers, which means they are neither balancing nor bandwagoning, but this strategy encompasses different definitions according to each scholar. Moreover, hedging possesses limits when it comes to different forms of power display and how to ascertain it and its evolution in the long run. Thereby I argue that middle powers can practice soft-balancing with accommodations of their own capabilities and to a certain extent, display a setting-agenda policy vis-à-vis great power. And they can achieve this policy by taking advantage of major outbreaks such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, middle powers can make full use of their economic growth, national identity, role in institutions and coalitions, and practice new and innovative forms of diplomacy which redefine their status. To demonstrate my argument, I am examining the case of Vietnam, a Southeast Asian country that since the COVID-19 pandemic, has been capable of progressing towards a globalist approach to its security strategy and role in the international order.