Critical Resource Rivalry: Lessons for the Modern Age

Great Powers have long competed over resources, but the mechanism by which particular resources become subject to coercive actions by rival states remains undertheorized. Basing the examination of these rivalries in the Geoeconomics field, this thesis expands the literature by proposing a novel five-stage framework. The scope of these competitions is limited to ones involving resources key for advanced technological development. The central claim suggests that the threshold for coercive action is lower than existing scholarship assumes: neither existential threat nor active war is required, only a scarce and critical resource concentrated in or near a strategic rival. The argument is tested through two cases. Firstly, the Allied efforts to disrupt Nazi heavy water production in Norway. Secondly, the United States's production of the SR-71 via means of Soviet-sourced titanium. This framework broadens the conditions under which states are expected to coerce. These findings relate directly to the contemporary competition between the United States and China over rare earth elements, and critical materials, such as gallium, germanium, and semiconductor inputs, where every scope condition the framework identifies is already met.