Published August 17, 2021 | Version v1
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Corrupt Bargains and Slick Alliances: Assessing the Impact of Natural Resources on Rebel Group Strategies in Colombia and Nigeria

  • 1. University of Chicago

Contributors

Description

How do natural resources affect tactics and strategies of socially endowed rebel groups? How can rebel groups that formed in response to a social or ethnic grievance turn to natural resource extraction, and what does that extraction lead to? Conventional literatures on rebel group participation and recruitment focus on specific rebel groups, either resource endowed or socially endowed groups, but none looks at how socially endowed groups change their strategies and tactics once they acquire natural resources. Most of the literature considers rebel groups to fit in one of these two neat boxes, and while those are useful for classification, they do not consider the ramifications of starting with one endowment, and then shifting to accommodate a different endowment, or some hybrid of the two.

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Other
oai:uchicago.tind.io:3131

UChicago Information

Division(s)
Social Sciences Division
Department(s)
Committee on International Relations (CIR)