The Dilemma of Bilateral Asymmetric Alliances: Exploring How the Stronger State Becomes Entrapped by the Weaker State

The dynamics of alliances in international politics often come with the risk of entrapment, where major powers might find themselves drawn into conflicts contrary to their interests due to obligations to weaker allies. While most studies highlight weaker states being influenced by their stronger counterparts, there are notable instances where the opposite occurs. This paper uses the prospect theory to illuminate two situations where dominant states are more susceptible to entrapment. Firstly, when major powers foresee a significant shift in their security environment due to a weaker ally's potential defeat, and secondly, when they believe that their strategic position would be considerably weakened without the alliance, and finding an alternative powerful ally is improbable. To demonstrate this, the paper examines Germany's situation during the July Crisis and China's stance before the Korean War. Both historical instances provide insights into why powerful nations might be led into conflicts by their lesser partners. This research aims to delve deep into the intricacies of asymmetric alliances and provide a fresh perspective on the concept of entrapment in alliance politics.