The Paradox of the Victimized Great Power: China's Strategic Narrative Construction

While victimhood has conventionally been understood as a marker of weakness, powerful states increasingly invoke narratives of suffering and injustice in their foreign policy. Why, then, does a great power choose to present itself as a victim while simultaneously seeking recognition as a confident and influential international leader? This thesis examines this paradox through the case of China. I argue that victimhood is not a fixed ontological condition but a flexible political resource that states—as rational, strategic actors—adapt to different audiences and diplomatic objectives. I develop a typology distinguishing between inclusive victimhood, which expands the boundaries of political community by emphasizing shared experiences of suffering, and exclusive victimhood, which contracts those boundaries by privileging the state’s own grievances and framing adversaries as perpetrators. Through interpretive discourse analysis, I analyze Chinese official rhetoric at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and in the South China Sea dispute. At FOCAC, shared victimhood fosters solidarity and legitimizes China’s leadership within the Global South; in the South China Sea, exclusive victimhood serves as a moral shield against criticism of China’s expansive claims. These findings suggest that victimhood and great-power status are not inherently contradictory. Rather, the political value of victimhood lies in its strategic malleability: by defining friends and foes and assigning moral responsibility, states can mobilize victimhood to advance cooperation, justify confrontation, and strengthen claims to international legitimacy.