Decisive Intervention or Quagmire in the Making: The Effects of Credibility on the Timing of Great Power Withdrawal from Asymmetric Conflicts

Why do some asymmetric conflicts end in quick great power withdrawals while others result in quagmires? Moreover, how do great powers, once stuck in quagmires, actually get out? This paper argues that great powers' concerns over credibility significantly shape their willingness to disengage from some asymmetric conflicts and the timing of their exit opportunities for otherwise costly and drawn-out wars. Through process tracing of great powers' wartime decision-making using declassified archival documents, memoirs, biographies, and autobiographies, I find that great powers are more likely to withdraw when doing so does not incur credibility costs and to delay withdrawal when exit would be highly costly to their credibility. I further find that completion of a "face-saving" campaign is necessary for great powers to carry out delayed withdrawals when credibility is on the line. I illustrate limitations in the existing war termination literature centered on the bargaining paradigm and propose credibility as a key factor explaining why some wars end sooner than strategic rationality would predict, while others persist even when continued fighting is strategically irrational.