Influence Without Power? Non-Great Powers, Institutional Rigidity, and Reform in Global Governance

This thesis examines how non-great powers seek to influence reform within international institutions, using South Africa as a case study, and why these efforts produce uneven outcomes across institutional contexts. While such states increasingly engage in global governance through coalition diplomacy, normative framing, and procedural participation, their ability to shape institutional reform varies significantly. Existing scholarship has emphasized power and institutional design, yet has paid less attention to how institutional structures condition the effectiveness of strategies used by less powerful actors. To address this gap, the study develops a framework centered on institutional rigidity, the extent to which governance structures constrain decision-making authority, agenda-setting, and procedural flexibility. Applying this framework to South Africa's engagement in the African Union (AU), the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the analysis shows that similar strategies produce different outcomes depending on the level of institutional rigidity. Flexible environments enable meaningful reform; rigid ones constrain it. The study demonstrates that variation in institutional design shapes the effectiveness of non-great-power efforts and offers insights into achieving change in a multipolar system.