Hedging Under Asymmetric Alliance: The Case of North Korea

Under what conditions does a dependent weaker ally engage its patron’s rival while preserving its relationship with the patron? This study examines North Korea’s summit diplomacy with the United States from 2018 to 2019. It develops the concept of hedging under asymmetric dependence, defined as a strategy in which a weaker state in asymmetric alliance engages the patron’s rival in a limited and reversible manner while maintaining its relationship with the patron. I argue that this strategy becomes most likely when three conditions converge: a perceived decline in patron reliability, increased domestic survival pressure, and an external opportunity created by great-power competition.

To evaluate this argument, I conduct a directed qualitative content analysis of Rodong Sinmun from 2017 to 2019. The analysis finds that North Korea indirectly criticized China following its participation in sanctions in 2017, framed sanctions as threats to its sovereignty and right to existence, and intensified its emphasis on self-reliance. In 2018, North Korea portrayed engagement with the United States as a means of establishing bilateral relations, a peace regime, and a favorable environment for economic development, while strengthening communication and strategic coordination with China. After the breakdown of the Hanoi summit in 2019, North Korea maintained engagement with Washington while strengthening relations with China and Russia and resuming military pressure.

These findings suggest that North Korea’s summit diplomacy represented limited strategic diversification rather than realignment toward the United States. Although official discourse cannot establish the leadership’s internal intentions, the observed pattern is consistent with hedging under asymmetric dependence.