The Risks and Rewards of Arms and Influence

What happens when a patron state stops supplying weapons to a client? It is a common belief among policymakers and scholars alike that the provision of arms generates leverage for patrons: if a client steps out of line, the patron can withhold weapons to gain compliance. Patrons are typically reluctant to exercise that leverage, fearing that the client will simply turn to alternative suppliers. Curtailing arms transfers is therefore a serious political act, and clients frequently interpret such curtailment as a deliberate insult. How, then, is a client likely to respond? Under what conditions might a client comply with the patron's demands, and when is it more likely to seek a new supplier? If a client does pursue an alternative, when is this outside option used as bargaining leverage with the patron, and when does it represent a genuine diversification of supply? To address these questions, I develop a reputational theory of client response strategies using an opportunity/willingness framework. I argue that the client's choice of strategy is conditioned on the client's opportunity and willingness to exit the patron-client relationship. First, does the client have a viable external source for the weapons it needs? Second, does the client perceive the patron as genuinely invested in its security, or merely a fair-weather friend? These two dimensions generate four potential response strategies: acquiescence, bargaining, endurance, and diversification. I test my theory using case studies of Iraq (1958-1982) and Pakistan (1947-1981). In each of these cases, I process trace multiple episodes of arms curtailment using primary source material from six supplier countries, including declassified internal government documents, official speeches and publications, memoirs of officials and diplomats, and contemporaneous media reports. I find that both cases exhibit patterns of response in line with my theoretical framework. By centering client agency and theorizing the behavior of weaker powers in relation to their stronger partners, this dissertation offers new insights into the risks and rewards of dependence in asymmetric bilateral relationships.