Donor Aid Conditionality, Strategic Reorientation, and Democratic Backsliding in Mali

This thesis examines how donor aid conditionality reshaped governmental accountability in Mali during the Third Republic (1992–2012) and contributed to democratic fragility. Using qualitative single-case process tracing, it draws on donor and Malian government documents, Afrobarometer surveys, news reporting, and secondary scholarship. I argue that dependence on external financing encouraged a long-term strategic reorientation of the state toward maintaining credibility with international financial institutions and donor partners. Malian governments retained agency within this relationship, negotiating delays, waivers, and concessions to manage domestic opposition while preserving the broader donor-backed framework. Over time, this institutionalized external accountability while making domestic accountability increasingly reactive, widening a gap between Mali’s international reputation and citizens’ experience of democratic government.  While the northern Malian rebellion and security crisis provided an immediate trigger for the 2012 coup, but the rupture exposed weaknesses in accountability and public trust that had accumulated across the preceding two decades. The findings identify how donor dependence can contribute to democratic erosion by reshaping the structure of governmental accountability.